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How New Jersey Can Mitigate Climate Change on its Coasts Through Nuisance-Based 
Restrictions on Development 
Jennifer Garster * 
I. Introduction 
 New Jersey’s 127 miles of coastline1 play a vital role in the state’s economy and its 
residents’ way of life.  While coastal communities have a long history of storms and flooding, 
sea level rise and changes in hurricane activity create new risks.  This vulnerability demands 
climate change adaptation policies.  Notwithstanding the importance of New Jersey’s coastline 
and its vulnerability, the state is legally ill-equipped to handle the threats of global warming.2 
 According to New Jersey’s Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), much of 
the state’s densely populated coastal areas are vulnerable to the effects of climate change, 
including flooding, increasingly frequent storms, erosion, and sea level rise.3  In New Jersey, 
62,209 homes are at risk of chronic flooding by 2045.4  These homes are worth more than $26 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2019, Loyola University of 
Maryland.  I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Angela C. Carmella, for her guidance and 
support in the writing of this Comment.  
1 NORBERT P. PSUTY & DOUGLAS D. OFIARA, COASTAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT: LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
FROM NEW JERSEY 9–10 (Rutgers Univ. Press eds., 2002). 
2 This Comment uses the terms “global warming” and “climate change” interchangeably.  
3 New Jersey’s Coastal Community Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping Protocol , NJDEP OFF. OF COASTAL 
MGMT. ii (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter NJDEP Assessment and Protocol], https://www.nj.gov/dep/cmp/docs/ccvamp-
final.pdf.  




billion, house approximately 79,000 people, and contribute nearly $390 million to local property 
tax bases.5  Despite these hazards, new construction and reconstruction continue in the state’s 
239 coastal towns, and municipalities have yet to respond to these realities.6  Shoreline 
developments throughout New Jersey have “frequently occurred without adequate regard for 
coastal hazards.”7  A study by Climate Central, a Princeton-based research group, and Zillow, the 
national real estate firm, “estimated that 3,087 homes [were] built [in New Jersey] between 2009 
and 2017—together worth more than $3 billion” in areas that are expected to flood once a year 
by 2050.8  
In protecting our coastlines, the government must balance private property rights against 
the threats of climate change.  Adaptation strategies, such as dune replenishment, have become 
common methods of coastline protection, but they come at an expense to the public.9  In most 
cases, coastal projects require the government to exercise its eminent domain power to obtain 
possession of strips of private property on coastal lots.10  New Jersey, despite the importance of 
its coast, does not have statutory or judicial policies to address legal issues when private property 
 
5 Id.  
6 Sustainable & Resilient Coastal Communities: A Comprehensive Coastal Hazard Mitigation Strategy Final 
Report, NEW JERSEY FUTURE 1 (Sept. 2017), https://www.njfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/New-Jersey-
Future-Resilient-Coastal-Communities-Project-Report-2017.pdf. 
7 Susanne C. Moser et al., Coastal Zone Development and Ecosystems, in Climate Change Impacts in the United 
States: The Third National Climate Assessment, 579 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM ED. 589 (May 
2014).  
8 Jon Hurdle, Estimate Revised Up of New Shore Homes Imperiled by Sea-level Rise, Storm Surge, NJ SPOTLIGHT 
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.njspotlight.com/2019/08/19-08-13-estimate-rises-of-new-shore-homes-
imperiled-by-sea-level-rise-and-storm-surge/.  
9 See T.J. Campbell & L. Benedet, Beach Nourishment Magnitudes and Trends in the U.S., SI 39 J. OF COASTAL 
RESEARCH 57, 63 (2006), available http://www.cerf-jcr.org/images/stories/09_tom.pdf; James G. Titus, Rising Seas, 
Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners , 
57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1308 (1998). 
10 See, e.g., Property Owners Throw Cold Water on N.J. Shore Protective Dunes Plan, W. VA. PUB. BROADCASTING 




rights and the threats of global warming are in balance.  The state is legally unprepared for 
handling the threat of climate change.  
This Comment evaluates the effectiveness and feasibility of climate change adaptation 
measures and argues that New Jersey, at the state and local level, must adopt holistic, data-driven 
solutions to adapt to this new reality, protect properties from flooding and storm surges, and 
preserve our coastal environment.  A comprehensive regulatory scheme aimed at mitigating the 
effects of global warming would recognize that development in areas vulnerable to repeated 
flooding is a nuisance that the government should regulate to minimize and phase out.  This 
Comment calls on New Jersey State courts to take an expansive approach to public nuisance 
doctrine under regulatory takings jurisprudence.  By recognizing that climate-driven regulations, 
as a form of nuisance prevention, are immune from takings claims, courts can facilitate 
environmental protection measures.  This Comment argues that regulation for the purposes of 
environmental protection is a public purpose.  If an area is vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change, then it is per se a nuisance to continue using that land.  Courts should broadly construe 
nuisance doctrine to serve as a preclusive defense to landowners’ regulatory takings claims.   
Part II will explore the harms of climate change and its impact on New Jersey’s coastline.  
It will provide data on rising sea levels, tidal flooding, the frequency and extent of storm surges, 
and erosion and the economic impacts of these phenomena.  In Part III, this Comment will 
introduce state and local governments’ land use regulation through the zoning power and takings 
power.  
In Part IV, this Comment will critique New Jersey’s response to climate change and the 
various existing strategies.  This section will also discuss the limitations of the use of eminent 
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domain and zoning powers.  Part V will advocate for an expansion of the nuisance doctrine to 
prevent the development of vulnerable coastal communities.   
Finally, in Part VI, this Comment will make a proposal for how New Jersey can mitigate 
the effects of climate change on coastal communities through land use regulations.  It will outline 
policy and statutory recommendations that should be incorporated into coastal communities’ 
planning ordinances.  The law would overtly recognize nuisance prevention as a legitimate land 
use control.   
II. Climate Change and its Effects on New Jersey Coastline  
A. Assessing the Harms of Climate Change  
 Global climate change is a change to “the average weather conditions over an extended 
period of time.”11  In the last fifty years, human activity has altered the environment on an 
unprecedented scale through greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.12  GHGs, such as carbon dioxide, 
in the atmosphere retain heat from sunlight, causing Earth to warm.13  As Earth warms, 
previously frozen regions melt, causing rising sea levels—a significant threat because 
approximately forty percent of the world’s population lives in coastal areas.14  
 A 2019 Rutgers University and Department of Environmental Protection report predicted 
that, by 2070, sea levels will rise nearly four feet in New Jersey, a projection that is two-times 
the global average.15  Using information from the report, a map “shows that nearly all of the 
 
11 Joseph F.C. DiMento & Pamela Doughman, Introduction: Making Climate Change Understandable , in CLIMATE 
CHANGE: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US, OUR CHILDREN, AND OUR GRANDCHILDREN, 1 (MIT Press 2014). 
12 See Causes of Climate Change, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html (last visited Jan. 5, 
2021) (finding that since the industrial era, humans have notably increased the amount of greenhouse gases emitted 
into the atmosphere); see generally, Overview of Greenhouse Gases, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) 
13 See Causes of Climate Change, supra note 12;  see generally, Overview of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 12. 
14 Economics and Demographics, NOAA OFFICE FOR COASTAL MGMT. (2020), https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-
facts/economics-and-demographics.html.  
15 NJDEP Assessment and Protocol, supra note 3, at 5. 
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Jersey Shore south of Point Pleasant Beach, as well as areas of Essex, Hudson, Passaic, Union, 
Cumberland and Salem counties, could be under water by 2070.”16  From 1911 to 2019, the sea 
level rose 1.5 feet along the New Jersey coast, compared to a 0.6 feet total change in the global 
mean sea level.17  Future projections of sea level rise indicate that New Jersey’s coastal areas are 
likely to experience sea level rise of 0.5 to 1.1 feet between the years 2000 and 2030, and 0.9 to 
2.1 feet between 2000 and 2050.18 
 New Jersey residents have also experienced more high-tide floods, or “sunny-day 
flooding,” in the absence of an associated storm.19  The frequency of high tides exceeding the 
current high-tide flood threshold will continue to increase with sea level rise.20  The average of 
high-tide floods in the 1950s was less than one per year.21  Between 2007 and 2016, Atlantic 
City averaged eight high-tide floods per year.22  Based on the projected range of sea level rise, 
Atlantic City will experience 17 to 75 days of expected high-tide flooding in 2030, and 45 to 255 
days in 2050.23 
  A 2019 report by the Rhodium Group concluded that tidal flooding has more than 
doubled.24  Since 1980, sea level has risen nearly six inches, and the number of homes at risk of 
sunny-day flooding has increased 110%.25  This affects approximately 23,000 homes and 
 
16 Davis, supra note 4. 
17 New Jersey’s Rising Seas and Changing Coastal Storms: A Summary of the 2019 Science and Technical Advisory 
Panel, RUTGERS (Nov. 2019) [hereinafter Rutgers Panel Summary], 
https://climatechange.rutgers.edu/images/STAP_SUMMARY_FINAL_FINAL_11-25-19.pdf.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Rutgers Panel Summary, supra note 17. 
24 Hannah Hess et al., New Jersey’s Rising Coastal Risk, RHODIUM GROUP (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://rhg.com/research/new-jersey-flooding-hurricanes-costs-climatechange/. 
25 Id.  
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commercial buildings worth a total of $13 billion.26  According to the study, the counties most at 
risk from flooding are Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic, and Monmouth.27 
 Coastal storms, such as tropical storms, hurricanes, and nor’easters, produce storm 
surges, the impact of which is heightened by tides and winds.28  Storm surge flooding can wash 
over barrier islands and create new inlets, thereby endangering protected wetlands.29  Studies 
have also shown that the frequency and extent of storm surges have increased since the 1980s; 
therefore, more of today’s buildings are now at risk of flooding once during a 30-year 
mortgage.30  Another threat is coastal erosion—one of the most common and persistent 
hazards.31  Wind, currents, and waves are the main contributors to erosion and are exacerbated 
by storms.32  
 The scientific community is in agreement about the effects of global warming.33  This 
Comment does not attempt to investigate the existing data and merely seeks to use this consensus 
as an aid in developing mitigation strategies.  
B. The Economic Impact of Climate Change 
 
 Rising sea levels, storm surges, and erosion not only have ecological impacts, but also 
threaten the highly developed Jersey Shore.34  Coastal flooding endangers private property, roads 
and bridges, storm-water infrastructure, utilities, and businesses.35  The Rhodium Group’s 2019 
 
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 NJDEP Assessment and Protocol, supra note 3, at 4.  
29 Id. 
30 Hess et al., supra note 24. 
31 NJDEP Assessment and Protocol, supra note 3, at 4.  
32 Id.  
33 See Consensus: 97% of Climate Scientists Agree, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (last visited 
November 1, 2020).  
34 See Laura Mansnerus, New Jersey is Running Out of Open Land it can Build On, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/24/nyregion/new-jersey-is-running-out-of-open-land-it-can-build-on.html. 
35 NJDEP Assessment and Protocol, supra note 3, at 4.  
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report focused on the economics of coastal risk from climate change.36  The report estimated 
that, since the 1980s, between 62,000 and 86,000 more homes and commercial properties, worth 
a combined value of more than $60 billion, are now in areas with a 1-in-30 chance of hurricane 
flooding.37  New Jersey coastline’s exposure is projected to grow.38  Based on sea level rise 
projections, an additional 73,000 to 113,000 buildings worth a combined $60 billion to $96 
billion will likely be in the 1-in-30-year floodplain by 2050.39   
 The effects of rising temperatures and sea levels are already having a significant impact 
on property values.40  Research by First Street Foundation suggests that tidal flooding caused by 
rising sea levels has reduced home values in New Jersey by $4.5 billion.41  Tropical storm 
Sandy, which made landfall in 2012, alone cost New Jersey $29.4 billion.42 
 These projections of climate change and its effects serve as important baselines for 
developing policy directions, including changes to land use regulation, that New Jersey must 
adopt to address these challenges.  Some see environmental regulation of private property as 
antithetical to economic growth.43  However, as is evident from the massive costs of Hurricane 
Sandy,44 “annual flooding will stifle growth more than any regulation.”45 
 




40 Tom Johnson, What’s Ahead for NJ — More Tidal Flooding, More Battering from Hurricanes? , NJ SPOTLIGHT 
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.njspotlight.com/2019/10/whats-ahead-for-nj-more-tidal-flooding-more-
battering-from-hurricanes/. 
41 Id.  
42 Chris Francescani, Chris Christie: Hurricane Sandy New Jersey Damage Will Cost At Least $ 29.4 Billion , 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/23/chris-christie-hurricane-
sandynewjersey_n_2179909.html. 
43 Naomi Klein, Capitalism vs. the Climate, THE NATION (Nov. 9, 2011), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/capitalism-vs-climate/.  
44 Francescani, supra note 42. 
45 Matthew Knoblauch, Land and Water Use in the United States: You Probably Shouldn’t Build There , 16 




III. New Jersey’s Land Use Regulation Options for Tackling Flooding 
New Jersey has several options, albeit inadequate, to tackle the threat of climate change.  
The Government may exercise its power of eminent domain to condemn entire properties or 
obtain easements over properties for purposes such as dune replenishment.  Localities may also 
use their zoning powers to regulate land use and development in coastal areas prone to flooding.  
Exercise of the takings and zoning powers, however, may lead to litigation if the government 
does not provide just compensation or the regulation’s economic deprivation is so extreme that it 
has the effect of a taking.   
Parts A and B provide a primer on land use regulation, including state and local actors’ 
power to enact zoning ordinances for the public welfare and use eminent domain.  Part C focuses 
on the claims private property owners may have against the government for taking such 
measures.  
A. A Primer on Zoning 
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution explicitly reserves those powers 
not so delegated for the States.46  This reservation of powers enables states to regulate land use.  
As industrialization and urbanization sent people from rural to urban and suburban areas in the 
early 1900s, some centralized control over land use patterns became necessary.47  Local 
governments were best equipped to deal with these local changes.48  By the late 1920s, to 
 
46 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”). 
47 See JOHN R. NOLON ET AL., LAND USE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (9th 
ed. 2017) (“Increased congestion in streets, deplorable housing conditions, new high rise buildings . . . and changing 
land use patterns raised numerous conflicts among private land owners.”). 
48 See id. at 2–4 (“Local governments were regarded . . . as creatures of the state, authorized by state law to exercise 
a wide variety of powers affecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens . . . .  It is within [the] context of 
state reserved authority, that cities, through state constitutional and statutory delega tions, regulate land use today.”).  
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promote the adoption of zoning ordinances by municipalities, the United States Department of 
Commerce created two standard enabling acts as guides for states to adopt when promulgating 
their own legislation.49  The Standard Zoning Enabling Act, published in its final version in 
1926, encouraged states to empower local governments to regulate zoning, including the power 
to regulate the height, size, use, and location of buildings, the size of lots, and population 
density.50  In 1928, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act encouraged municipalities to 
develop comprehensive plans for “harmonious development” in order to “best promote health, 
safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare . . . .”51 
These standard acts were published shortly after the landmark case Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty, which held that zoning was a valid exercise of the states’ police powers.52  The 
Village of Euclid adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance that regulated and restricted “the 
location of industries, apartment houses, two-family houses, single family houses, etc., the lot 
area to be built upon, the size and height of buildings, etc.”53  Ambler Realty Company owned a 
tract of land in the village and argued that the ordinance operated “to reduce the value of [its] 
lands and destroy their marketability for industrial, commercial[,] and residential uses” and 
constituted “a present invasion into [its] property rights” and a violation of due process.54 
 
49 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and Standard City Planning Enabling Act , American Planning Association 
(2021), https://www.planning.org/growingsmart/enablingacts/. 
50 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 1 (1926), https://planning-org-uploaded-
media.s3.amazonaws.com/legacy_resources/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf  (“For the purpose of 
promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities an d 
incorporated villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of 
buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open 
spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, 
residence, or other purposes.”). 
51 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, City Planning Enabling Act § 7 (1928), https://planning-org-uploaded-
media.s3.amazonaws.com/legacy_resources/growingsmart/pdf/CPEnabling%20Act1928.pdf. 
52 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926). 
53 Id. at 380. 
54 Id. at 386. 
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The Court upheld the ordinance as “a valid exercise of authority,”55  but cautioned that 
the zoning power is not without limit:  
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must find 
their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public 
welfare.  The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate 
assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation.56 
New Jersey has several coastal zoning statutes.  The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL) 
of 1976 is New Jersey’s enabling legislation for municipal land use and development planning 
and zoning.57  The state legislature also passed the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) 
in 1973 “to protect the unique and fragile coastal zones of the State.”58  This Act calls upon the 
state to assist “in the assessment of impacts, stemming from the future location and kinds of 
developments within the coastal area, on the delicately balanced environment of that area” so as 
to avoid “continuing and ever-accelerating serious adverse economic, social and aesthetic 
effects.”59  CAFRA requires that all coastal areas be dedicated to uses “which promote the public 
health, safety and welfare, protect public and private property, and are reasonably consistent and 
compatible with the natural laws governing the physical, chemical and biological environment of 
the coastal area.”60  CAFRA was significantly expanded in 1993, and the threshold for issuance 
of permits by the DEP was heightened to provide greater protection to sensitive coastal areas.61  
At this time, however, the legislature also repealed a prior version of the CAFRA statute that 
directed the DEP to compose a long-term environmental management strategy for coastal 
areas.62  Today, the Coastal Zone Management Rules promulgated by NJDEP establishes the 
 
55 Id. at 397. 
56 Id. at 387. 
57 Municipal Land Use Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-25–52:27D-310 (West 2017).  
58 In re Egg Harbor Assocs. (Bayshore Centre), 464 A.2d 1115 (1983).  
59 Coastal Area Review Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-2 (West 2016), 
https://www.nj.gov/dep/landuse/download/13_19.pdf. 
60 Id.  
61 Committee Statement, N.J. STAT. ANN. 13:19-2 (West Supp. 2002). 
62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-16, repealed by L. 1993, c. 190, § 2 (effective July 19, 1994). 
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rules regarding the development of coastal resources and requires a coastal permit for waterfront 
development.63 
With respect to post-storm beach restoration, the NJDEP has enacted regulations 
applicable “to all beaches which are impacted by coastal storms with a recurrence interval equal 
to or exceeding a five-year storm event.”64  These after-the-fact responses to storms, however, 
are inadequate to fight the full scope of the impending threat of climate change.  
Environmental protection interests are often incompatible “with traditional landowner 
beliefs in the freedom to use legally owned land as they wish.”65  Despite the widespread 
acceptance of zoning and planning in the post-Euclid century, there remains a tension between 
governmental regulation and private ownership of land.  This tension will escalate as the 
government increasingly regulates land use to mitigate the effect of climate change.  Further, 
states, in exercising their zoning power, also risk running afoul of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, addressed below.66  
A unique problem—problem of the nonconforming use—occurs when ownership and use 
of a property predate a zoning ordinance prohibiting such use.67  In the interest of eliminating 
inconsistent uses and achieving uniformity within a zoning area, the state may impose 
restrictions on nonconforming landowners by limiting expansion or reconstruction of the 
property.68  In New Jersey, though, nonconforming use statute provides that 
“[a]ny nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an ordinance may be 
 
63 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7-1.1; 7:7-2.1–2.5 (2021). 
64 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7-10.3 (2021). 
65 Jonathan E. Cohen, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning and Land-Use Based Environmental 
Controls, 22 B.C. ENV’T. AFF. L. REV. 307, 329 (1995). 
66 See Section III.D.  
67 John R. Nolon, Well Grounded: Using Local Land Use Authority to Achieve Smart Growth, Environmental Law 
Institute, 447, 452 (2001). 
68 NOLON ET AL., LAND USE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 35, 187 (2012). 
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continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied and any such structure may be restored or 
repaired in the event of partial destruction thereof.”69  The statute thus allows shoreline 
homeowners to repair storm damages.  It also enables these homeowners to come into 
conformance with new zoning standards for climate-change mitigation by, for example, raising 
their homes to avoid flooding.   
B. A Primer on Eminent Domain 
Eminent domain may be useful in mitigating the ecological and economic harms of 
climate change because it enables the state to take land that is vulnerable to repetitive flooding.  
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes two 
limitations on the state’s power to exercise eminent domain: the government (1) can only take 
property for “public use” and (2) must provide “just compensation.”70  The New Jersey 
Constitution likewise provides: “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”71  The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the protections afforded by the 
State’s constitution are “coextensive” with the protections afforded by the United States 
Constitution.72  
Any use that is dedicated to a public purpose qualifies as a valid public use.73  The public 
use doctrine has expanded in recent years, giving legislatures broad latitude in determining what 
 
69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-68 (West 2020).   
70 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. IV, § 6, P 3 (“Any agency . . . which may be 
empowered to take or otherwise acquire private property for any public [uses] . . . may be authorized by law . . . but 
such taking shall be with just compensation.”). 
71 N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
72 Mansoldo v. State, 898 A.2d 1018 (N.J. 2006). 
73 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479, 481 (2005) (“It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as 
well as carefully patrolled.” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954))). 
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needs justify the exercise of the takings power.74  Although the government “may not take the 
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B,” it “may transfer 
property from one private party to another if future use by the public is the purpose of the taking” 
or, for example, if the purpose of the taking is economic development.75  
The Constitution’s guarantee of just compensation ensures that the property owner will 
be “in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been 
taken.”76  Therefore, compensation is just if it is based on the fair market value of the property at 
the time of the taking.77  
In City of Long Branch v. Liu, beachfront property owners claimed that the state owed 
them compensation for the taking of their property for a state-funded beach renourishment 
project.78  The City of Long Branch passed an ordinance creating a redevelopment project , which 
sought to acquire oceanfront property, including the commercial property owned by the 
plaintiffs, the Lius’s.79  Plaintiffs rejected the City’s $900,000 offer and the City initiated a 
condemnation action.80  At this time, the property had increased by two acres from the deed 
description due to a beach replenishment project undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers in 
the 1990s.81  The Lius family argued that the City’s action should account for the increased 
shoreline landmass resulting from the replenishment project and that they should be compensated 
for the taking of this newly created land.82  The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the doctrine 
 
74 Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: A Five-Year, State-by-State Report Examining the Abuse of Eminent 
Domain, INST. FOR JUST. (April 2003), https://ij.org/report/public-power-private-gain/. 
75 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481. 
76 Almota  Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (quoting United States v. 
Reynolds, 379 U.S. 14, 16 (1970)). 
77 See, e.g., id. at 474. 
78 4 A.3d 542, 547 (N.J. 2010).  
79 Id. at 546.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 546–47.  
82 Id. at 547. 
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of avulsion because the average high water mark remained the boundary line between state-
owned and privately-owned property.83  Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs could not be 
recompensed for the taking of property to which they had no right.84  
C. Regulatory Takings  
Even when the government does not overtly exercise its eminent domain power and 
initiate a condemnation proceeding, a landowner may argue that a land use regulation works, in 
effect, as a taking.85  A regulatory taking includes (1) ad hoc balancing takings and (2) 
categorical takings that are either (a) physical takings or (b) total takings.86   
An ad hoc balancing claim involves government regulations that have unreasonably 
“interfered with [the claimant’s] distinct investment-backed expectations.”87  In Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Supreme Court used an ad hoc balancing test to 
determine whether a regulatory taking had occurred.88  Penn Central involved a challenge to 
New York City’s historic landmarking law, which precluded the development of air space above 
Grand Central Terminal.89  The Supreme Court balanced several factors: the owner’s ability to 
continue current use, the mitigating effects of transferable development rights, the reciprocity of 
the law’s burdens and benefits, and the distinct investment-backed expectations; ultimately, the 
Court upheld the law.90  The Court added that the landowner’s economic interests must be 
 
83 Id. at 555. 
84 City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 555. 
85 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
86 See id. at 124–38 (finding that physical takings and state and local regulation may constitute unconstitutional 
takings requiring just compensation); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
87 Penn Cent., 438 U.S.at 124. 
88 See generally id. at 104. 
89 Id. at 107. 
90 Id. at 138.  
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weighed against the nature of the government action and whether it can be characterized as a 
physical invasion or a mere interference for the public good.91   
In a physical takings claim, private property owners must allege that the government has 
authorized a physical occupation of all or part of their property.92  In Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the Supreme Court 
indicated that the government’s right to renourish and protect the coastline might be superior to 
the rights of private landowners.93  The Florida legislature had passed the Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act in 1961, creating procedures for beach restoration and renourishment projects 
by depositing sand on eroded beaches (restoration) and maintaining the deposited sand 
(renourishment).94  Walton County and the city of Destin received permits to restore seven miles 
of beach that had been eroded by hurricanes. 95  Members of a nonprofit corporation who owned 
beachfront property alleged that the state and local governments’ restoration projects were 
unconstitutional takings because it deprived them of their rights to accretion.96  The Supreme 
Court held that there was no taking because the restoration and renourishment projects did not 
infringe on coastal landowners’ rights.97  The Court deduced two principles from Florida law: (1) 
the state, as the owner of submerged land adjacent to beachfront property, has the right to fill that 
land, and (2) the avulsion, or exposure of previously submerged land, belongs to the state even if 
it interrupts a beachfront property owner’s contact with the water.98  Because the plaintiffs could 
 
91 Id. at 124. 
92 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Catv Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 
519, 522 (1992).  
93 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
94 Id. at 709. 
95 Id. at 711.  
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97 Id. at 731. 
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not show that they had rights to future avulsions or contact with the water that trumped the 
state’s right to fill submerged land, there was no taking.99  
In categorical total takings claims, property owners argue that they were required to 
“sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave 
[their] property economically idle.”100  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council demonstrates 
when coastal protection may go “too far” as to be considered a taking.101  There, the Court held 
that the Beachfront Management Act (BMA) in South Carolina, which barred Lucas from 
erecting structures on his beachfront property, totally deprived the property of all beneficial uses 
and constituted an economic wipeout.102  The Court concluded that the BMA was a per se 
taking.103  
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Spiegle v. Beach Haven, however, rejected a 
categorical takings claim that a regulation was so onerous as to bar any real beneficial use.104  In 
response to a disastrous storm that hit Long Beach Island, New Jersey, in 1962, Beach Haven 
adopted an ordinance preventing construction east of an ocean-side geographic line.105  The 
plaintiffs had erected fences extending ocean-ward, in violation of the ordinance, and the 
defendant removed the fences.106  Plaintiffs filed suit and sought damages for the demolition of 
the fence, arguing that the “ordinance [was] unconstitutional because if the regulations were 
enforced against their particularly described land they would be deprived of its use.”107  
 
99 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 730. 
100 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1019 (1992). 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the defendants produced unrebutted evidence 
“that it would be unsafe to construct houses [ocean-ward] of the building line . . . because of the 
possibility that they would be destroyed during a severe storm—a result which occurred during 
the storm of March 1962.”108  Further, the court noted, “that such regulation prescribed only such 
conduct as good husbandry would dictate that plaintiffs should themselves impose on the use of 
their own lands.”109  
A New Jersey appellate court reached a similar conclusion based on a due process 
argument in McGovern v. Borough of Harvey Cedars:  
“[i]n light of the island’s history of devastating storm damage, we cannot say that 
an ordinance prohibiting building close to the water’s edge in order to protect the 
dunes and to prevent property damage from storms, is irrational, arbitrary or 
lacking a real and substantial relationship to the purpose of protecting the public 
health, safety and welfare.”110   
Spiegle and McGovern indicate New Jersey courts’ willingness to recognize the heightened 
public interest at stake when the government regulates for purposes of protecting our coastlines.  
They also suggest that these interests may be superior to the property rights of landowners.  
In attempting to regulate use of coastal property to mitigate sea level rise, New Jersey is 
likely to face more regulatory takings claims.  Courts’ approaches to these claims, whether for 
categorical or ad hoc balancing takings, should grant wide latitude and flexibility to 
municipalities when the zoning ordinance is enacted for purposes of adapting to climate change.  
New Jersey’s options—zoning ordinances and the exercise of eminent domain powers—
are inefficient, delayed responses to the threat of global warming.  These options may lead to 
increased litigation if the state does not provide just compensation or the regulation’s economic 




110 McGovern v. Borough of Harvey Cedars, 401 N.J. Super. 136, 148 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
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advocates for an expansive view of nuisance law to prevent development in vulnerable coastal 
communities and serve as an affirmative defense to landowners’ takings claims. 
IV. Critique of New Jersey’s Existing Options to Fight Climate Change 
In response to the impending threats of climate change and recent superstorms such as 
Hurricane Sandy, New Jersey has considered a variety of programs and doctrines as a means of 
adapting and mitigating these threats.  In 2019, Gov. Phil Murphy signed an executive 
order creating the Climate and Flood Resilience Program at the state’s Department of 
Environmental Protection.111  The order established an Interagency Council on Climate 
Resilience, comprised of sixteen state agencies, to develop short-term and long-term plans.112  
Prior to this order, the Sustainable and Resilient Coastal Communities project, funded by the 
NJDEP, released a report that outlined strategies municipalities can take to respond to rising seas 
levels.113  These include refocusing development and capital investments, enacting more resilient 
building standards, and protecting wetlands.114  The report also directed the state to support 
communities by adopting uniform projections of sea level rise to determine how projects and 
programs receive state funding, creating a coast-wide adaptation plan to serve as a framework, 
revising the state’s land use laws to require risk management on the part of localities, and 
developing sustainable financing sources to help communities implement adaptation measures.115  
 
111 Exec. Ord. No. 89, NJ.GOV (Oct. 29, 2019), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-89.pdf; Brent 
Johnson, N.J. Needs More Protection Against Future Powerful Storms, Murphy Says , NJ ADVANCE MEDIA (Oct. 29, 
2019), https://www.nj.com/politics/2019/10/nj-cant-stop-the-next-sandy-but-we-can-be-more-resilient-murphy-says-
in-announcing-new-initiative.html. 
112 Johnson, supra note 111. 
113 Sustainable & Resilient Coastal Communities: A Comprehensive Coastal Hazard Mitigation Strategy , NEW 
JERSEY FUTURE (Sept. 2017), https://www.njfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/New-Jersey-Future-Resilient-
Coastal-Communities-Project-Report-2017.pdf; David Kutner, New Report Outlines Coastal Resilience Strategies, 
NEW JERSEY FUTURE (Dec. 13, 2017), 
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All of these strategies have legal implications for eminent domain jurisprudence, regulatory 
takings jurisprudence, and nuisance doctrine.  
This section will analyze and critique the current options implemented by and available 
to New Jersey.  Part A critiques the use of eminent domain as a means of acquiring easements 
for beach restoration projects.  Part B discusses the limits of the public trust doctrine since it is 
best applied to undeveloped areas and not New Jersey’s highly developed coastline.  Finally, Part 
C exposes the inherent limitations in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and 
voluntary buyout programs, which represent ad hoc responses to storm damage and 
unsustainable methods of fighting climate change-related property loss.   
A. Eminent Domain’s Limited Use as a Means of Acquiring Easements for Beach 
Restoration Projects   
One potential solution state and local governments can implement is the use of eminent 
domain to condemn at-risk properties.116  Eminent domain, however, is an extreme measure that 
is fact-intensive, costly, controversial, and leads to community disruption.117  This Comment 
argues that it should be a last-resort effort to acquire parts of property, specifically, for dune 
replenishment projects.118  The methods discussed in this section are only narrowly useful for 
combatting the effects of climate change in certain instances but insufficient for protecting New 
Jersey coastlines from all the effects of climate change moving forward. 
The federal government has presented state and local officials nationwide with a difficult 
choice: “[a]gree to use eminent domain to force people out of flood -prone homes, or forfeit a 
 
116 See Section III.B.  
117 Christopher Flavelle, Trump Administration Presses Cities to Evict Homeowners from Flood Zones, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/climate/government-land-eviction-
floods.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage. 
118 See Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 527 (N.J. 2013). 
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shot at federal money they need to combat climate change.”119  This choice is part of an effort by 
the Army Corps of Engineers to protect Americans from flooding and coastal storms.120  At the 
end of 2015, “the Corps said that voluntary programs were ‘not acceptable’ and that all future 
buyout programs ‘must include the option to use eminent domain, where warranted.’”121  The 
Corps has a formula to decide which homes should be condemned:  
It estimates how much damage a house is likely to suffer in the next 50 years, 
then compares that to what it would cost to buy and tear down the house, plus 
moving expenses for the owner.  If the buyout costs less, the homeowner is asked 
to sell for the assessed value of the home.  That price is not negotiable, and 
neither is the offer.122 
 
Although New Jersey has declined to evict residents,123 the Corps is pressing the state to 
use eminent domain or face loss of federal funds to fight climate change.124  Gene Pawlik, 
spokesman for NJDEP, said in 2020: “Eminent domain procedures should only be used when 
direct purchase negotiations with land owners fail to reach an agreement on price or when land 
title matters prevent closing the transaction, and the planned project cannot be completed for the 
greater public benefit without acquisition of those properties.”125  
While New Jersey is unlikely to resort to eminent domain as a means of condemning 
entire properties, this power remains a viable option for taking easements over beachfront 
properties for purposes of beach replenishment programs.  An easement is an interest in land in 
another’s possession, entitling the easement holder to limited use or enjoyment of that land.126  
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Beach nourishment programs take sand from other sources and place it on an eroded beach to 
build up dunes and broaden coastal surfaces.127  But this often creates a costly cycle of erosion 
and replenishment.128 
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the use of eminent domain to obtain an 
easement in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, a case that arose out of a dune building project 
on Long Beach Island (LBI).129  LBI is a densely populated barrier island in Ocean County, and 
the island’s tourism-related industries significantly contribute to the county’s $14.2 billion gross 
income.130  In recognition of LBI’s massive economic contribution, the federal government and 
the island’s municipalities jointly established a storm protection and beach restoration project in 
2008.131  This included a dune renourishment plan to enlarge the dunes and protect homes from 
flooding during storm surges.132  These dunes were either adjacent to or on private property, and 
state and local governments were responsible for acquiring the property.133  In the borough of 
Harvey Cedars, sixty-six property owners gave the municipality permission, leaving sixteen 
properties over which the municipality had to exercise eminent domain.134  One of the properties 
belonged to the Karans.135  The borough offered them $300 for the right to build a dune on their 
ocean-side property; the Karans refused, arguing that they deserved more compensation because 
the dune would diminish their ocean view.136  The municipality initiated the condemnation 
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procedure and a commission appointed by the trial court137 determined that compensation be set 
at $700.138  Again, the Karans refused, relying on New Jersey’s condemnation jurisprudence.139  
New Jersey higher courts had instructed lower courts to disregard the public benefits that would 
accrue through the condemnation, even if the property at issue would benefit , as well.140  The 
trial court judge concluded that the jury should not hear the benefits of the dune project, and the 
jury calculated that Harvey Cedars owed the Karans $375,000 in compensation.141  
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court opted to change its approach to partial takings 
cases.  It determined that when calculating the amount of just compensation owed, it must 
consider the public benefit—here, the storm protection provided by the dunes.142  In cases where 
eminent domain is used to take an easement, i.e., partial takings, New Jersey courts did not have 
a straightforward method of determining the fair market value of the property for compensation 
purposes.143  Eschewing its own precedent, the Court held: “the fair-market considerations that 
inform computing just compensation in partial takings cases should be no different than in total-
takings cases.  They are the considerations that a willing buyer and a willing seller would weigh 
in coming to an agreement on the property’s value at the time of the taking.”144 
 
137 See Eminent Domain Act of 1971, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3–12(b) (West 2020) (“Upon determination that the 
condemnor is authorized to and has duly exercised its power of eminent domain, the court shall appoint 3 
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After the state supreme court handed down its decision, the parties settled for $1.145  The 
Army Corps constructed a two-story-high dune in 2008.146  It was because of these dunes that the 
Karans’ $1.7 million home withstood Hurricane Sandy, which ravaged parts of the coast without 
improved barriers.147  
It is evident that the use of eminent domain to condemn one’s entire property is 
problematic from a mitigation policy point of view because it is fact-intensive, costly, and 
controversial.  Eminent domain, however, is an effective tool in acquiring easements to build 
dunes as part of beach renourishment projects.  Dune restoration and beach renourishment are 
primary means of protecting the shoreline from rising sea levels.148  As sea levels rise, tidal 
marshlands and beaches migrate inland.149  These lands can keep pace with a 0.1 inch per year 
rate of sea level rise; New Jersey’s current rate of sea level rise, however, is 0.11 to 0.16 inches 
per year, a rate that is expected to increase.150  Despite these threats, “[t]here is currently no 
coordinated, interagency effort to identify agreed upon estimates for future sea level rise.”151  In 
formulating New Jersey’s broader plan to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change, 
condemnation proceedings should be used to obtain easements where beachfront property 
owners are resisting such protective measures.  In conjunction with beach replenishment and like 
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programs, courts should take an expansive approach to nuisance doctrine, as discussed below in 
Part V, to enable the state to accomplish its mitigation strategies.152  
B. Limits of the Public Trust Doctrine  
Another potential legal solution to mitigate the effects of climate change is an extension 
of the public trust doctrine.153  This doctrine is based on the premise that certain areas are of such 
public importance that they are unsuited for private ownership and better held by the government 
in trust for the people.154  In 2019, Governor Murphy enshrined the public trust doctrine into 
state law.155  The statute ensures that people’s ownership of coastal shorelines is held in trust by 
the state and other public entities, protecting the public’s right to access these public trust 
lands.156 
The New Jersey Supreme Court expanded this doctrine in Borough of Neptune City v. 
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, recognizing that the “public’s rights in tidal lands . . . extend [to] 
recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, and other shore activities.” 157  The court 
emphasized that the “public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be 
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and 
needs of the public it was created to benefit.”158  
In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, the state’s highest court further 
expanded the doctrine to include the public’s right to access some privately owned beaches under 
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certain circumstances.159  While holding that the association’s restriction on beach access to 
residents only was contrary to the public’s right to enjoy ocean-related recreation, the Matthews 
court also noted the need to accommodate the private property owners’ rights.160  Because much 
of New Jersey’s vulnerable coastline is highly developed,161 however, this doctrine is of limited 
applicability to the state’s current situation because it is best applied to undeveloped areas such 
as tidal lands.   
C. Problems with the National Flood Insurance Program and Voluntary Buyout Programs  
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a federally-backed flood-insurance 
program intended to expand protection for homeowners whose standard homeowners’ insurance 
does not cover flood damage.162  Homeowners seeking to file a claim must comply with the 
NFIP’s standards.163  Under the NFIP, New Jersey has the third-highest repetitive loss.164  Since 
the 1970s, more than 3,300 New Jersey homes and businesses have been repeatedly flooded and 
rebuilt.165  Repairs have been covered under the NFIP and have cost about $700 million.166  
Seventy percent of these properties have been repaired at least five times, with a median payment 
for each flood of about $25,000.167  Hurricane Sandy resulted in an additional 144,000 claims 
and $6.25 billion in debt, “as well as allegations that thousands of homeowners were wrongfully 
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denied payouts by companies administering flood insurance on FEMA’s behalf.”168  What 
exacerbates the issue is that there is no limit to the number of claims an individual can make and 
the emphasis is on rebuilding, not mitigating.169 
Federal guidelines under the NFIP require elevation or demolition if damage is estimated 
at fifty percent or more of the home’s value.170  Beachfront properties, however, are assessed too 
low compared to their high property value.171  This is because the NFIP’s building standards are 
based on the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), which does not account for future flooding.172  
Although these standards may be effective today, their future effectiveness will reduce as the 
FIRM fails to reflect changing flood conditions.173  
While the NFIP could, in theory, discourage development in areas prone to flooding since 
potential buyers would have to consider the cost of insurance when buying a home,174 the 
opposite has occurred.  After NFIP’s enactment, development in flood -prone areas increased.175  
NFIP premiums are cheap and do not accurately reflect the risk of flooding and, in effect, 
subsidize the development of previously undesirable land.176  But, “[m]aking the homeowners 
pay rates that reflect their true flood risk could . . . mean sharp premium hikes and a public 
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backlash over affordability.”177  Congress must decide whether to raise rates on the one in five 
homeowners who pay below-market premiums.178  The NFIP is currently financially insolvent 
and relies on bailouts from the federal government.179  As of December 2019, the NFIP is 
$20.525 billion in debt.180  
The NFIP also provides funding for buyout programs.  These programs have their own 
inherent limitations due to limited funding, their voluntary nature, and their reactive rather than 
proactive responses.  Through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, “FEMA, the administrative 
agency responsible for the NFIP, is allowed to fund up to 75% of the expenses of voluntary 
buyouts.”181  These subsidies, however, vary based on the timing of the buyout plan: “the 75% 
contribution occurring only after a federally-declared major disaster.”182  The present structure 
thus “incentivizes states and localities to voluntarily buy out homeowners and property, but to 
wait until after a disaster declaration to do so.”183 
NJDEP’s Blue Acres program, implemented after Hurricane Sandy, buys back vulnerable 
properties on a voluntary basis.184  Blue Acres relies on a number of eligibility requirements.185  
Criteria include a property’s history of repeated flooding186 and whether the acquired property is 
suitable for recreational activities.187  The program targets clusters of flood damaged homes or 
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entire neighborhoods for purchase, offers up to 100% of the pre-storm value of the home, and 
seeks to demolish these homes to create conservational areas.188  As of 2016, the program has 
extended 900 offers and has successfully purchased almost 700 homes.189  
While the program appears to be successful, there are several criticisms.  As a strictly 
voluntary program, the cluster approach requires collective participation of willing sellers.190  
This leads to the problem of holdouts, which would require use of eminent domain to initiate a 
condemnation proceeding, an option which is undesirable to many.  Jeff Tittel, director of the 
New Jersey Sierra Club, argues that the Jersey Shore is being excluded from the program.191  
Most of the “program’s $300 million budget has purchased homes in neighborhoods with values 
far lower than many Sandy-flooded Shore communities.”192 
There has also been political backlash to the Blue Acres Program.  Local politicians 
claim that this affects municipalities’ tax base.193  Mayor Robert Campbell of Downe Township 
stated that his township “stands to lose 6%, or $9 million, in ratables – after having already lost 
10% of the ratable base after Sandy.”194  Federal agencies are also putting pressure on 
municipalities by making the availability of future assistance contingent on localities’ 
participation in the buyout.195   
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Voluntary buyout programs, and other NFIP-related remedies, represent ad hoc responses 
to storm damage.  With the impending threats of climate change, however, the state must work to 
mitigate property loss, not just respond to it after a disastrous storm hits.  The NFIP as it 
currently operates is an unsustainable method of fighting property loss due to climate change.  
V. Expanding Nuisance Doctrine  
To succeed in holding back the sea, New Jersey must adopt data-driven solutions based 
on the theory that repetitive flooding and the destruction of natural resources is per se a nuisance. 
Eminent domain, public trust doctrine, the NFIP, and voluntary buyout programs have limited 
applicability and are ill-suited to mitigate the effects of global warming.  Instead, this Comment 
advocates for New Jersey courts to adopt an expansive view of nuisance law to combat further 
development in vulnerable coastal communities.  Environmental regulations that restrict the 
development and destruction of wetlands and other aquatic resources can be construed as laws 
preventing harm to the community, thereby serving as government’s defense to landowners’ 
takings claims.  
Some commentators have suggested the use of nuisance law to combat further 
development in vulnerable coastal communities.196  Nuisance law balances private landowners’ 
property rights against those of the neighboring community.197  This option is premised on the 
notion that “the destruction of wetlands or other aquatic resources constitutes a public 
nuisance.”198  Many jurisdictions have found that the destruction of these resources is a 
“community harm,” and some have gone even further to hold that such nuisances serve as a 
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“preclusive defense” to a landowner’s takings claim.199  Nuisance doctrine can come into play 
when weighing the burdens against the benefits of an alleged government taking.  One could 
argue that land use inconsistent with environmental conservation measures is not part of a 
landowner’s bundle of property rights.200  Not all courts, however, are willing to adopt such a 
premise.201 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council provides that nuisance doctrine may function as 
an affirmative defense in cases where government regulation deprives property of all 
economically beneficial use.202  Petitioner Lucas had purchased two residential lots in Charleston 
County, South Carolina, that he intended to build homes on.203  The Beachfront Management Act 
(BMA), however, had the effect of barring Lucas from erecting any habitable structures on these 
two parcels.204  Lucas argued that the BMA extinguished his property’s value and amounted to a 
taking.205  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, agreed. The Court held that when a state enacts 
a regulation depriving the landowner of all economically beneficial use, the state may avoid 
paying compensation only if the landowner’s use was not part of the landowner’s original title, 
but rather inherited through preexisting restrictions imposed by state property law and nuisance 
law on land ownership.206  The Court reasoned that nuisance doctrine, as an affirmative defense, 
should be considered in an “antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate.”207  At this 
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stage, the government bears the burden of proving that “the proscribed use interests were not part 
of [the landowner’s] title to begin with.”208   
The Court remanded the case to determine whether state common law would have 
prevented Lucas from erecting a habitable structure on his land.209  On remand, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court found that state common law principles did not prevent a nuisance; 
therefore, a taking had occurred.210 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence stressed the importance of a broad construction of the 
defense, asserting that “the common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of 
regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society.”211  This “antecedent inquiry” has 
suspended “the principle question in a traditional takings analysis—did the government go too 
far?” until the court considers the question, “did the landowner go too far?”212  Recognition of 
nuisance doctrine as a defense to takings claims enables the government when regulating for 
purposes of mitigating the effects of global warming, to prevail in the early stages of litigation.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court might favor Justice Kennedy’s theory of nuisance 
doctrine as evidenced from its decision in Karan.213  Holding that it was an error to not instruct 
the jury on the benefits of a protective sand dune, the Karan court reasoned that the burden to the 
individual property owner “may be infinitesimal compared to the value added to their home by 
the dune protection.”214  Likewise, in Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court observed that environmental regulations restricting private land use “may have a 
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greater claim to public interest than traditional zoning.”215  As the McGovern court noted: “we 
cannot say that an ordinance prohibiting building close to the water’s edge in order to protect the 
dunes and to prevent property damage from storms, is irrational, arbitrary or lacking a real and 
substantial relationship to the purpose of protecting the public health, safety and welfare.”216  
This suggests that New Jersey courts may have a proclivity towards “liberalizing legal theories 
based on nuisance or public trust doctrine.”217  By granting claims of environmental protection 
greater weight in the regulatory takings analysis, New Jersey courts would support legislative 
efforts of climate change mitigation.  
VI. A Proposal for New Jersey 
Although New Jersey has attempted to use several of the previously discussed methods to 
mitigate the effects of climate change, these methods are inadequate for fully protecting our 
coastlines from imminent environmental and economic damage.  This Comment urges New 
Jersey courts and legislature to overtly recognize nuisance prevention as a legitimate land use 
control and defense to regulatory taking claims.   
Lawmakers faced with the threat of climate change must adopt holistic, data-driven 
solutions to adapt to the new reality of a warming Earth, protect properties from flooding and 
storm surges, and defend our unique coastal environment.  First and foremost, New Jersey must 
require the Climate and Flood Resilience Program, established by Governor Murphy, to 
collaborate with state agencies to develop short-term and long-term plans that not only mitigate 
the effects of climate change but also adapt to this new reality.  Both state and local governments 
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must implement the programs’ recommendations into statutory zoning schemes and voluntary 
buyout programs.  
Part A of this section will advocate for an expansion of preexisting statutory protections 
to barrier islands and other coastal areas.  Part B recommends that zoning ordinances be 
improved to discourage development in vulnerable coastal areas, include stricter non-conforming 
use guidelines, and overtly recognize nuisance law as a legitimate land use control and defense to 
regulatory takings claims.  Finally, Part C suggests the use of voluntary buyout programs as a 
last resort when the same effect cannot be achieved through zoning.  
A. Extension of Existing Wetland Protections to Barrier Islands and Coastal Areas  
New Jersey has a body of law dealing with environmental protection aimed at conserving 
ecological areas such as coastal and freshwater wetlands.218  The regulations establish specific 
factors to consider when determining whether a proposed activity in such areas is in the public 
interest.219  These factors include the public’s interest in preserving natural resources and the 
ecological value of the wetlands, interest of private landowners in economic development, extent 
of public and private need for the proposed activity, practicability of alternative sites, permanent 
beneficial or detrimental effects of the proposed activity, and quantity of wetlands that will be 
disturbed.220  These environmental laws constitute exceptional protection of wetlands.  The 
environments affected by climate change, however, are not limited to wetlands.  This Comment 
calls on New Jersey to extend such protections to coastal areas and barrier islands—regions that 
are equally valuable from an ecological perspective since they often protect wetlands.221 
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B. Updated Zoning Ordinances, Recognition of Nuisance Doctrine, and Limits of Eminent 
Domain   
This comment argues that zoning ordinances be used to discourage development in flood-
prone areas.  Local planners must use up-to-date flood mapping and climate change projections 
to determine which coastal areas are most at risk from rising sea level.  Based on predictions of 
who is most at-risk, planners should impose stricter guidelines for new development in these 
areas.  Such regulations would expand upon that which is already authorized by the MLUL.222 
Currently, the MLUL authorizes regulations that include zoning for low-density uses, 
establishing minimum requirements for construction, and requiring setbacks from shorelines.223  
Municipalities should take such regulations one step further and limit property owners’ ability to 
rebuild structures subject to repetitive flood losses.  
This may present a problem of the nonconforming use—when ownership and use of a 
property predates a zoning ordinance prohibiting such use.224  In the interest of eliminating such 
uses and achieving uniformity within a zoning area, the state may impose restrictions on 
nonconforming landowners by limiting expansion or reconstruction of the property.225 
In New Jersey, “[a]ny nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage 
of an ordinance may be continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied and any such 
structure may be restored or repaired in the event of partial destruction thereof.”226  The statute 
thus allows shoreline homeowners to repair storm damages.  It also enables these homeowners to 
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come into conformance with new zoning standards for climate-change mitigation by, for 
example, raising their homes to avoid flooding.   
The MLUL does not define what constitutes partial destruction.227  In Motley v. Borough 
of Seaside Park Zoning Board of Adjustment, however, the New Jersey Appellate Division held 
that a landowner’s demolition of his nonconforming property did not qualify as a partial 
destruction, but rather, a total destruction.228  In Motley, the plaintiff owned a property in Seaside 
Park Borough that was restricted to single-family use.229  The property was a nonconforming, 
preexisting use because the two structures built before the enactment of the zoning ordinance did 
not conform to the ordinance’s lot and setback requirements.230  After suffering water damage 
from water pipes that had burst, the entire structure had to be removed.231  The plaintiff tore 
down the structure to its foundation for reconstruction, and the Zoning Board issued a stop work 
order, concluding that the reconstruction exceeded the plaintiff’s zoning permit.232  The Motley 
court noted that there is a policy of closely restricting nonconforming uses and stated the 
applicable inquiry: “the test of whether a nonconforming use or structure may be restored or 
repaired is whether there has been some quantity of destruction that surpasses mere partial 
destruction.”233  The property was then severely damaged in Superstorm Sandy.234   
In coastal areas prone to flooding and erosion, preexisting uses must be phased out by 
gradually reducing development and discouraging new growth.  While localities are not allowed 
to take active steps to eliminate nonconforming uses, they may impose restrictions on them and 
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prohibit their expansion.235  By making a strict distinction between partial and total destruction, 
municipalities and courts can impose more stringent restrictions in coastal areas already ravaged 
by storm surges and flooding.  Phasing out such uses will also minimize the damage sustained 
during coastal storms and rising sea levels, thereby reducing the cost of such damage.   
New Jersey should enact new statutes recognizing that development in areas already 
vulnerable to repeated flooding is a nuisance that the government can regulate to minimize and 
mitigate.  These statutes should declare that regulation for the purposes of environmental 
protection is a public purpose; thereby, they would overtly recognize nuisance prevention as a 
legitimate land use control and defense to regulatory taking claims.  Under Lucas, the 
legislature’s findings must be based on common law principles.236  Since this Comment argues 
that New Jersey Courts are open to the notion that the common law of nuisance is robust enough 
to protect oceanfront communities, the legislature would echo and reinforce the common law.  
Therefore, the statutes would codify the common law principles of nuisance.  New Jersey laws 
should declare that if an area is so vulnerable to the effects of climate change—flooding, storm 
surges, erosion, etc.—then it is per se a nuisance to continue using that land.  This would save 
the state the expenses associated with defending a condemnation proceeding and further 
conservationist interests.   
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Mansoldo v. State suggests this sort of 
expansive view of nuisance law.237  In that case, the NJDEP had restricted construction on 
Mansoldo’s vacant property which was in a floodway to limit flood damage.238  Mansoldo was 
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thus prevented from constructing two residential buildings that were otherwise permitted .239  The 
Mansoldo court reversed the lower court decisions and established the proper inquiry: whether 
the regulation denied the landowner all economically beneficial use of the property and, if so, 
whether the state was required to pay just compensation unless property and nuisance law 
principles precluded the intended use.240   
Similarly, in Seven Mile Island, L.L.C. v. Planning Bd. of Avalon, the New Jersey 
Appellate Division announced a deferential approach to municipalities’ broad police powers.241  
At issue in Seven Mile Island was the Borough of Avalon’s enactment of beach protection 
ordinances, which prohibited the construction of pools in dune areas and whether these 
ordinances were preempted by CAFRA or the MLUL.242  The court held that municipalities on 
barrier islands vulnerable to storm damage might “adopt ordinances consistent with and similar 
to, but more stringent than, CAFRA’s requirements in order to address its local concerns.”243  
Further, it concluded that a prohibition “on construction of swimming pools in dunes, an 
environmentally sensitive area, is rationally related to an important public purpose.”244 
Mansoldo and Seven Mile Island evince New Jersey state courts’ willingness to defer to 
localities initiatives to protect its vulnerable areas.  Municipalities should enact ordinances that 
declare that once a building in a coastal area has suffered storm damage, the landowner cannot 
rebuild.  To limit such damage in coastal areas, municipalities must restrict what construction is 
allowed through ordinances such as those at issue in Mansoldo and Seven Mile Island.  State 
courts, to ensure the effectiveness of local climate change mitigation efforts, should conclude 
 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 1024.  
241 No. A-5270-07T3, 2009 WL 1750422, *24, *26 (2009) (Super. Ct. App. Div. June 23, 2009). 
242 Id. at *1–2.  
243 Id. at *22. 
244 Id. at *27. 
39 
 
that such restrictions do not constitute a regulatory taking because of the nuisance exception 
announced in Lucas.245  Recognition that the cycle of rebuilding structures and consequent 
destruction of coastal resources is a public nuisance would serve as a preclusive defense to 
landowners’ regulatory takings claims.   
If the same result could not be achieved through zoning regulations, local governments 
may resort to the use of eminent domain.  This Comment urges that use of eminent domain be 
limited to obtaining easements across a property.  Climate change mitigation strategies, such as 
beach renourishment projects, pose minimal burdens on the individual property owner while 
adding invaluable protection from storm surges and flooding.  New Jersey courts have already 
demonstrated a proclivity towards this liberal theory of nuisance doctrine and should overtly 
incorporate this into takings jurisprudence to prevent unnecessary litigation. 
C. Voluntary Buyout Programs as a Last Resort  
New Jersey should only resort to voluntary buyout programs in those cases where the 
same effect could not be achieved through zoning.  Voluntary buyout programs are limited in 
application because they are not feasible on a large-scale level, because of their voluntary nature, 
and because they are often used ad hoc—available to homeowners only after their homes have 
been destroyed by flooding.246  Such programs, however, can be revised by statute to serve as a 
more proactive climate adaptation strategy that integrates scientific data on an areas’ 
susceptibility to flooding.  By focusing on small communities of property owners, buyout 
programs can avoid resistance that comes along with taking away a municipality’s tax base.247  
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These programs must also ensure that buyout prices adequately re-capture homeowners’ value of 
their property and social capital while assisting homeowners in relocating.248   
All these remedies require community engagement.  State and local actors must ensure 
that climate change mitigation is an interactive process with opportunities for public input.  
Zoning regulations, dune replenishment projects, and voluntary buyout programs all have 
potential to disrupt communities.  Engaging locals in the conversation around climate change and 
coastal protection is crucial to ensuring the success of these measures and reducing the potential 
for litigation.  
VII. Conclusion 
 To succeed in holding back the sea, New Jersey must adopt data-driven solutions based 
on the theory that repetitive flooding and the destruction of natural resources is per se a nuisance.  
Rising sea levels threaten private and public interests alike and therefore require a collective 
solution.  All the tools necessary to adapt to rising sea levels are in place—the scientific models 
predicting sea level rise, zoning and takings powers, and jurisprudence that can insulate localities 
from takings claims based on nuisance doctrine.  These tools now must be put to use.  New 
Jersey must shift its focus from recovery to mitigation and adaptation, from reactive measures to 
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